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"On Liberal Terms:" The Boston
Hide-Merchants in California
« From Dana's Two Years before the Mast, a vast literary audience has
read of the activities of Boston hide-traders in California during the
1840's. But Dana's understanding of the business of which he was a
small part was far less accurate than his knowledge of ships and the sea.
This gap is now filled by Dr. Fritzsche's analysis of the mechanics and
profitability of the trade.
There is a general belief that during the late eighteenth and
the early nineteenth century Yankee traders in the Pacific made enor-
mous profits in their business ventures. The fur trade with China is a
well-known example of this type of highly speculative, risky, but,
under favorable conditions, profitable business. The hunting
grounds for fur-bearing animals along the western coast of America,
however, were nearly depleted by 1820 and the fur traders who
had prospered for a few years or decades had to turn toward new
goods and methods of commerce.
A new possibility offered itself in California; not off the coast
or on the Santa Barbara Channel Islands where otters and seals
formerly abounded, but on the shores and in the valleys of the
Coastal Range. Here, Spanish missionaries had impressed on the
native Indians the good tidings of the Gospel and the hard work
of cultivating the wilderness. Spain had begun to colonize Alta
California in 1769, although the territory was known and had
been claimed for by the Spanish since 1542.1 The long-neglected
task of converting the California Indians into faithful Christians
and industrious subjects had been forced upon Spain by the same
fur traders — Russian, English, French, Portuguese, and Yankee —
who had discovered the potential of the Pacific Ocean. It no longer
remained a Spanish sea, disturbed only by occasional freebooters
like Drake and Piet Heyn, but now aroused the interest and
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the envy of sea-going nations around the world. To secure the
American Pacific Coast from her rival powers, Spain began to erect
missions along the Camino Real, and the Yankee traders in the
Pacific witnessed their growth, especially of their cattle which soon
roamed the lovely hills of the Coastal Range by tens of thousands.
The Yankee, however, had no access to these developing pastoral
riches, for Spain strictly prohibited any foreign trade with her
colonies. Nor were the missions meant to be producers of com-
mercial goods; a mission was basically a self-sufficient economic
unit which supplied no goods in excess of its own demands.
When California became part of the new and independent state
of Mexico in 1821, the old Spanish policy was abolished and the
ports of California were opened to foreign trade. Among the first
to turn from the fur trade with its diminishing returns to the new
potential of the California market was the Boston firm of Bryant,
Sturgis & Co. From 1822, when William Gale directed the ship
Sachem to the shores of California, Bryant, Sturgis & Co. played
an important role in the hide and tallow business.2 Hide-traders
sent out from Boston imported New England articles of every
description and exchanged them for the hides and tallow of Cali-
fornia missions and later of the private rancheros. The tallow was
resold to Russians in Alaska or to South America; the hides were
carried back to Boston where they found a ready market. One
Bryant, Sturgis & Co. ship even earned literary fame. In 1834,
Richard Henry Dana, a student at Harvard, signed on as a com-
mon sailor aboard the brig Pilgrim which was about to sail to Cali-
fornia. His book, Two Years before the Mast, published in 1840,
became the widely known and classical account of the dreary busi-
ness of collecting hides in exchange for, among other things, gun-
powder, laces, pickles, Eau de Cologne, percussion caps, and
underwear. Whereas Dana mastered the difficult and strange lan-
guage of the sailor, and vividly describes all the maneuvers of a
ship at sea in the precise terms of an old salt, he is less reliable in
his reflections on the state of business in California. What he saw
was the fact that all commodities were much more expensive in
California than in his native Boston. From there, it was but a
small step to the conclusion that his employer must be making
enormous profits. Dana's opinion, and that of others who made
similar deductions, was — and still is — generally accepted.
2
 For a detailed account of the California hide and tallow business, see Adele Ogden,
"Hides and Tallow: McCulloch, Hartnell and Company 1822-1828," California His-
torical Society Quarterly VI (1927), 254-64; "Boston Hide-Droghers along the California
Shores," ibid., VIII (1929), 289-305.
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There is, however, a much less known statement by a prominent
member of the Hudson's Bay Company, who came to California
to investigate the possibilities of trade relations with California.
In 1841, James Douglas (later Sir James and governor of British
Columbia) wrote in his diary: "Bryan & Sturges of Boston trade on
liberal terms, generally at an advance of 100% on cost with charges
and never calculate on clearing over 10% which they consider a
fair profit."3
This article intends to show, with the aid of the account-books
of William Appleton & Co., that Douglas' observation of "trade on
liberal terms" is more truthful and accurate than Dana's, although
his estimate of a profit of 10 per cent is not quite correct. The
subject of our analysis is the firm of William Appleton rather than
that of Bryant, Sturgis & Co. because the available source material
is much more abundant in the case of the first business venture of
Appleton into California than for any other firm or single enter-
prise. As the firm of William Appleton & Co. was, in many re-
spects, the direct successor of Bryant, Sturgis & Co., this substitu-
tion seems justified. In 1841, when Douglas made his statement,
Bryant, Sturgis & Co. was about to pull out of California and to
dissolve its copartnership.4 At the same time, William Appleton
& Co. began to fit out a ship for California and relied heavily on
the funds and the advice of its predecessors. Thomas Shaw, a for-
mer employee and a copartner of Bryant, Sturgis & Co. was engaged
to fit out the ship for Appleton. Henry Mellus, supercargo and
agent in California, who had served his apprenticeship with Bry-
ant, Sturgis & Co. — and, indeed, with Richard H. Dana 6 — was
engaged to carry on the business for account of Appleton. Bryant,
Sturgis & Co. also provided 9/22 of the necessary funds for the
voyage.
In February 1842, the three-masted ship Barnstable was ready
to sail from Boston. Her cargo, valued at $33,000, consisted of a
great variety of trade goods. Captain James B. Hatch commanded
the vessel on the long voyage around Cape Horn, and, on July 7,
1842, she landed at Monterey and began the wearisome business of
hide-trading. She returned to Boston in April 1845, her hold filled
to capacity with hides.6 From the Barnstable's account books, we
3
 Dorothy B. Smith, (ed.), Sir James Douglas in California: From his diaries. (Van-
couver 1965), 22.
* The business papers of both Bryant, Sturgis & Company and William Appleton &
Company are in possession of the Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of Business
Administration, Boston, Mass. The two collections will be referred to in the notes as Bryant
Papers and Appleton Papers, respectively.
5
 Richard H. Dana, Two Years before the Mast (New York, 1840), chapt. XVIII.
'Appleton Papers, vol. 118, Henry Mellus to Appleton, Dec. 24, 1842; ibid., vol. 4.
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can deduce that by December 1 — after all the hides had been
sold — the net profit of this long business venture was $4,599.74.7
This small profit seems to confirm Douglas' statement. Although it
is not quite clear what he meant by "a profit of 10%" (whether
10 per cent of the first cost of the cargo, of the selling prices in
California, or of the invested capital) it is undisputable that the
profit realized by the Barnstable is modest in every respect.
It is obvious that this investigation of a single operation is not
necessarily representative for the whole of the California trade.
Better and more reliable figures would result from a statistical
survey. Yet the source-material is far too incomplete to permit a
statistical computation of the average profit rate. There is another
way to determine the validity of the above figures, however. A
detailed analysis of the Barnstable's account books reveals the
different factors and forces which ultimately determined the voy-
age's net profit. By examining these factors, and by comparing them
with complementary contemporary sources, we shall be able to
conclude whether the Barnstable's net profit in question was
achieved under normal circumstances. If the circumstances were
normal, i.e. if the determining factors were "average," then the
profit must be average, too. By the proposed method we shall also
gain a deeper insight into the business methods of the California
hide-traders than either a statistical survey or Dana's account pro-
vide.
In order to obtain a clear picture, data taken from the Ledger,
Journal, Invoice Book, Ship's Accounts, and Sales Book 8 have been
arranged according to modern principles into a Balance Sheet
(Table 1) and a Statement of Profit and Loss (Table 2). From
Table 1, it appears that the enterprise was financed by several
persons, the firm of Appleton & Co. having only 9/22 of the entire
stock. The partnership with Bryant, Sturgis & Co., A. Lawrence,
A. Robinson, and Henry Mellus was formed for the sole and ex-
press purpose of fitting out the ship Barnstable for her voyage to
California. When the ship returned, the partnership was — at
least technically — dissolved, the surplus divided among the part-
ners in proportion to their investment, and the main asset, namely
the ship, sold to a newly formed partnership which, incidentally,
consisted of the same persons as the first one. This type of business
association, known since the days of the East India Company,
was especially advantageous from the point of view of accounting.
7
 See Tables 1 and 2.
8
 Appleton Papers, vols. 2, 4, 22, 23, 29, 118.
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TABLE 1
SHIP Barnstable, FIRST VOYAGE
RECONSTRUCTED BALANCE SHEET, DECEMBER 1, 1845
Assets
Value of ship
Surplus stores
Cash
$16,500.00
135.23
56,282.69
$72,917.92
Liabilities
Capital stock
Bryant, Sturgis &
Co.
A. Robinson
A. Lawrence
H. Mellus
Wm. Appleton &
Co.
Surplus
$21,737.61
6,210.75
9,316.12
3,105.37
27,948.33
$68,318.18
4,599.74
$72,917.92
Source: Appleton Papers (Baker Library, Harvard Graduate School of Business Admin-
istration, Boston, Mass.), vols. 2, 4, 22, 23, 29, 118.
Upon termination of every single venture (voyage), the books
which invariably showed the tendency to become more and more
difficult to keep could be closed, with a sigh of relief, I assume,
on the part of the accountant. The clean sweep after every adven-
ture is reflected in the Balance Sheet, which shows that all credi-
tors had been satisfied and all outstanding debts had been collected
before the final surplus was computed and divided among the
partners.
William Appleton, under whose name the business was carried
on, was a shareholder in the enterprise as well as its agent. Accord-
ingly, he drew his 7/22 share from the final surplus arid a com-
mission of 2/2 per cent on the outfit for his services on behalf of
the partnership (see heading "Commission" in Table 2). In other
words, the adventure of the Barnstable involved two firms: the
financing firm, which dissolved with the happy return of the ship,
and the managing firm of William Appleton & Co. The capital
stock for the venture amounted to $68,318.18. This odd figure is
explained by the fact that all expenses incurred up to the date of
the ship's departure were added up and divided among the partners.
All further expenses after that date were paid by William Appleton
& Co. and charged to the account of the owners of the Barnstable.
Technically speaking, these owners became debtors of William
Appleton & Co. and had to pay back their debt with interest. As
Appleton was coowner of the ship, however, he was, from the point
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TABLE 2
SHIP Barnstable, FIRST VOYAGE
RECONSTRUCTED STATEMENT OF PROFIT AND LOSS,
FEBRUARY 1843-DECEMBER 1845
Expenditures
Cargo
Cargo to be sold in California
Stores
Outfit
Wharfage, premiums,
keeper's pay, boards
etc.
Specie
labor aboard ship,
$33,000.00
6,035.07
ship-
and sails, oars, telescope,
227 Doubloons, 400 Mex. $, premiums
Commissions
2K% on outfit, K% on
Appleton & Co.
Wages for ship's crew
Monthly wages:
master $75
1st mate $33
2nd mate $20
3rd mate $15
carpenter $20
specie in favor of
steward
cook
sailmaker
6 seamen
Wm.
$14
$13
$13
$12 each
8 ord. seamen $5 to $10 each
$39,035.07
1,646.75
4,019.60
1,065.91
Average time of employment 38 months. Some
dismissed earlier
Insurance premiums
Insured with various companies. Ship for
$24,000, cargo for $36,000 = $60,000. Pre-
mium: 7/2% of sum insured plus Ys% per
month for time in excess of 30 months.
Commission
2/2% of operating cost in favor of Wm. Appleton &
Co.
Supercargo and clerk
Supercargo: Commission of 6/2% of net pro-
ceeds of goods shipped back in favor of
Henry Mellus $5,097.23
Pay clerk, assisting supercargo 150.00
10,538.14
6,843.67
249.10
Other expenditures
Depreciation of ship
Bought for
Carried to new account for
$21,500
-16,500
5,247.23
494.22
5,000.00
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Sales charges
Duties on cargo, fire insurance, wharfage, weigh-
ing and delivering hides, storage, interest on
charges, commission
Surplus
Total Expenditures
Returns
Freightage
1 launch Boston-California
Gold California-Boston
Sale of sea-otter skins
80 skins, average price $56.25 each
Sale of bullock horns
8,500 horns
Sale of gold
160.73 oz. melted, 892 % fine
Sale of hides
Hides per Alert
Net proceeds of hides, shipped per
Alert and for ace. of Barnstable
Sold in Boston
27,280 merchantable hides
672,039 lbs. @ lOtf $67,203.90
1,525 culled hides
39,659 lbs. @ 8<t 3,172.72
Minus brokerage 1,160.07
6,807.96
4,599.74
$85,547.69
$100.00
85.64
$185.64
4,500.00
297.50
2,958.96
$1,047.64
69,216.55
Sold in Antwerp
Net proceeds of 3,000 hides, shipped
to Antwerp and sold there 7,206.17
77,470.36
Total Returns $85,547.69
Source: See Table 1.
of view of accounting his own debtor or, if you prefer, his own
creditor.9
The Barnstable's cargo is specified in the Invoice Book on more
than thirty pages with about 1,500 single entries. It is a seemingly
random collection of the most varied trade goods. As a matter of
fact, it had been selected carefully for the California market. It
was one of the most important duties of the agent in California to
advise the management in Boston on the goods which were in great
' These expenses with interest did not amount to much. In Table 2 they are included in
"Other expenditures."
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demand.10 The Invoice Book does not distinguish between "cargo"
(to be sold in California) and "stores" (provisions for the crew).
Approximative figures are, therefore, inserted in the Statement of
Profit and Loss. These are based upon invoices for comparable
ships, namely Admittance and Monsoon.11 It is difficult to neatly
separate "cargo" from "stores" anyway, as it was sometimes the
policy of the traders to declare certain trade goods as "stores" in
order to evade custom duties.12
The Barnstable, a three-masted ship 119' 11" X 26' 1" X 13' 2"
and of 373 tons burthen,13 was purchased second-hand for $21,500.
The Statement of Profit and Loss contains a heading "Depreciation
of Ship." It might be misleading insofar as this expression does
not occur in the original account books. The whole problem of
amortization and depreciation was yet unsolved at that time. Ap-
pleton's accountant, however, overcame the difficulties of entering
into the books the fact that the ship lost in value during its use
for a voyage to California. Upon termination of the first trip, he
debited the ship to a new account — "Ship Barnstable 2nd voyage"
— at $16,500. Deducting this sum from the original purchase price
of $21,500, we arrive, in fact, at a depreciation of $5,000.
After the ship had left Boston, there were few additional ex-
penses to pay. The necessary cash for letters and other minor items
was advanced to the captain by William Appleton & Co. and was
charged to the account of the ship's owners. More substantial ex-
penditures, namely wages for the ship's crew ($10,538.14) and
insurance premiums ($6,843.67) became due only upon termination
of the voyage and were paid from the proceeds of the sale of the
return cargo. It is also important to note that all expenses incurred
during the Barnstable's long stay in California do not appear on our
Statement of Profit and Loss. This is due to the fact that trade
practice placed both ship and cargo either under the responsibility
of the supercargo aboard ship or of the agent in California. In
our case, the agent Henry Mellus awaited the Barnstable at Mon-
terey, acknowledged the receipt of the cargo in good order, and
proceeded to do business at his own discretion. From the in-
coming proceeds, he also had to satisfy the demands connected
with the operating costs of the ship. Above all, he had to pay the
excessively high custom duties which amounted to $29,795.33."
10
 Appleton Papers, vol. 118, Henry Mellus to Appleton, Dec. 24, 1842; ibid., vol. 84,
Henry Mellus to Appleton, March 31, 1843.
11
 Ibid., vol. 23; Bryant Papers, vol. 7.
12
 Appleton Papers, vol. 84, Henry Mellus to Appleton, Jan. 25, 1846.
™Ibid., vol. 118.
"Ibid., vol. 118, Henry Mellus to Appleton, Dec. 24, 1842.
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The small amount of cash (see Table 2) carried along, namely
400 Mexican Dollars and 227 Doubloons, was just enough to pay
the first installment of the taxes. This portion had, according to the
Mexican laws, to be paid in cash. Furthermore, the agent had to
provide for fresh provisions, beef, and vegetables. These and all
other expenses for the upkeep of the ship and her crew were paid
from the revenue of the cargo.
Naturally, the agent had to render account of all his business
transactions. Nevertheless, he was entirely free in his decisions and
disposed of the merchandise at his own discretion, based upon a
thorough and up-to-date knowledge of the California market. He
was, in fact, a plenipotentiary representative of his Boston employ-
ers. In a letter to Captain James P. Arthur of the California, for
example, they stated unmistakably: "The ship is assigned to Messrs.
Park and Mellus and you will follow their instructions in the same
manner as if they were given by ourselves." 15 The principals in
Boston could not possibly take direct action in California due to
the great distance between the seat of the firm and the actual place
of business which caused a long delay of letters and instructions.
It was, therefore, the only reasonable solution to place the entire
responsibility in the hands of an agent. This meant that only per-
sons with a highly developed sense of business were eligible for
such a position. It also meant that the agent, on whose judgement
depended the success or failure of the entire enterprise, had to be
paid accordingly. The supercargo's or agent's commission of 6M
per cent of the net proceeds of goods shipped back illustrates in
figures how much he was valued. His remuneration of $5,097.23
is the biggest slice in the distribution of the company's earnings;
in fact, it is bigger than the net profit which was to be divided
among the investors. From the books of Henry Mellus, there re-
main but a few pages and none of them is related to the Barnstable.
They are drawn up, however, in the manner of a simple, single-
entry system. Mellus had to send these accounts to Boston for
revision but they do not form an integral part of Appleton's account-
ing system. Even Mellus' "Invoice of Goods Shipped Back" 16 from
California has no bearing on the books of Appleton. The return
cargo was only credited to the account of "Ship Barnstable 1st
voyage" after it had been sold. No surplus resulting from the dif-
ference between purchase price in California and selling price in
13
 Bryant Papers, vol. 11, Bryant to Capt. Arthur, June 11, 1838.
"Appleton Papers, vol. 118; ibid., vol. 22, p. 163.
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Boston, therefore, is set out in the statement of Profit and Loss
although it was quite considerable as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
SHIP Barnstable, FIRST VOYAGE
BUYING AND SELLING PRICES OF THE RETURN CARGO
Item
31,805 hides
8,500 bullock horns
80 sea-otter skins
160.73 oz. gold
Buying price
in California
in$
63,458.75
255.00
2,800.00
2,848.00
$69,361.75
Selling price
in Boston
in $
76,422.72
297.50
4,500.00
2,958.96
$84,179.18
Sources: First column, Appleton Papers, vol. 22, p. 163. Second column, see Table 2.
The return cargo, then, was sold at an increase of $14,817.43, or
21.36 per cent, on the purchase price in California. From Table
3 it also appears that the cargo invoiced at cost in Boston for
$33,000 - bought goods in California valued at $69,361.75. These
figures correspond roughly with Douglas' statement, cited above,
of an "advance of 100% on cost." Herein, however, custom duties
are not included. It has been noted that all expenses in California
had to be paid from the proceeds of the cargo, i.e. the $33,000
invested in trade goods not only paid for the return cargo of
$69,361.75 but also for the custom duties and for minor expenses
for the upkeep of the ship. Although it is impossible to determine
the amount paid for provisions and other expenditures, we can
safely assume that, all in all, the cargo was worth slightly more than
$100,000 in California. This, again, roughly corresponds with the
statements of many visitors to California, among them Dana, that
imported goods were sold at about three times the Boston prices.17
Turning now to the sale of the return cargo we see, from Table 2,
that by far the most valuable part of it consisted of hides. Most of
them were sold in the important hide market in Boston; some of
them were shipped to Europe and sold in Antwerp. The total sale
of hides, including those which had been shipped back earlier by
the Alert but for account of the Barnstable, amounted to $77,470.36.
The small amount of sea otter skins is a remainder of the once im-
17
 Dana, loc. cit.
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portant fur trade which had, by 1840, dwindled into insignificance
if not into oblivion. On the other hand the equally small amount
of gold brought back from California seems to presage the Gold
Rush of 1849. It had not, however, been mined in the "mother
lode country" which afterward supplied most of the precious metal,
but rather in some stream of Southern California where gold was
known to exist in small quantities. The bullock horns, finally, were
of no importance with regard to the revenue derived from them.
They had primarily been used to cover the bottom of the ship's
hold, so as to separate the hides (which were very sensitive to
moisture) from the wet planks.
After this brief survey of the business methods of the California
hide-traders, we can now discuss the central question of whether
the voyage of the Barnstable can be deemed a typical or average
example of this type of business. The surplus of $4,599.74 seems
to be rather below what we expect even from a firm trading "on
liberal terms." It had been achieved on an investment of $68,318.92
within forty-five months (February, 1842 to December 1845); the
average gain per year was, therefore, $1,226.60, or 1.80 per cent.
This is definitely below average interest rates. A deposit in any
bank would have yielded a higher interest with much less risk.
There are, however, other considerations to be taken into account.
The firm of William Appleton & Co. had, to be sure, other gains
from the investment. For Appleton it produced other benefits in
addition to the modest capital gain. Through this investment a
business became possible which earned the firm, for its services, an
amount of $3,419.79 in commission. The same applies to Henry
Mellus, who had contributed 1/22 to the capital. It yielded him
not more than $209.08 in interest, but it helped to provide him
with a job of a very high earning capacity, namely 6/2 per cent of
the proceeds, or $5,097.23.
On the other hand, the investment was quite unsatisfactory for
the silent partners, Bryant, Sturgis & Co. There is no reason to be-
lieve that they invested their money with the expectation of earning
as little as 1.80 per cent. From other sources, we can deduce that,
in fact, the voyage of the Barnstable was a rather unfortunate one.
The years of 1841-1843 were extremely dry in California. The
badly needed winter rains failed, with the result that in the fol-
lowing summer seasons the cattle did not find enough pasture.
The rancheros refused to kill their bullocks because they would
not yield enough tallow, another important product of California
ranching. Business, therefore, was at a low. Henry Mellus wrote
BOSTON HIDE-MERCHANTS 477
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.2307/3112529
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 10 Jul 2017 at 16:18:01, subject to the
to Boston that "all who are doing business here complain most
bitterly, for no one has done even tolerably well."18 For the
Barnstable it meant that she had to remain longer than expected
in California until she could collect a full return cargo.
Ordinarily, a hide ship would take twenty-four to thirty-two
months for her voyage to and from California.19 It is obvious that
with a voyage of shorter duration many costs which adversely
influenced the final surplus would have been less — especially,
wages and insurance premiums. Also, the surplus would have been
realized within a shorter period and, consequently, the annual
interest rate on the investment would have been higher. Table 4
represents a Statement of Profit and Loss based upon the actual
accounts of the Barnstable but calculated on an "average" duration
of thirty months (instead of thirty-six months). To this procedure
one might object, arguing that the historian's business is to state
facts and not to speculate about what could have been under other
circumstances. On the other hand speculations on how a situation
might develop are a very real, a vital part indeed, of business life.
We may safely assume, that Bryant, Sturgis & Co., when lending
its money to the Barnstable, made similar calculations, based upon
its own experience with the California hide trade. What is done
here, then, is only what the merchants interested in the Barnstable
did themselves. As we have no written account of their reflections,
we have to reconstruct them ourselves, always drawing from the
same sources they had at hand.
From these sources, it also appears that the Barnstable was un-
fortunate both in buying hides and in selling them. Due to the
exceptional dryness in California they were lighter than usual.
Ordinarily, a hide would weigh about 26 pounds.20 The ones the
Barnstable brought back averaged only 24.63 pounds (see Table 2).
As the hides were bought in California per piece and sold in
Boston by weight, this 5.27 per cent underweight — compared to
the average weight of a hide — meant an equal loss of profit margin.
But the most severe blow to the enterprise was the falling price
for hides on the Boston market. On the unstructured market of
California, the hides commanded a stable price of $2.00 each. This
price remained, in fact, so stable and unchanging that the value of
a hide became a standard measure in business. Thence the nick-
18
 Appleton Papers, vol. 84, Henry Mellus to Appleton, Nov. 28, 1843.
"Hubert H. Bancroft, History of California (San Francisco, 1884-90), III, 381ff.; ibid.,
IV, lOOff. and 562ff.; ibid., V, 576ff. Also, William H. Davis, Seventy-five Years in
California (San Francisco, 1929), 255-56.
20
 Bryant Papers, vol. 11, Bryant to Henry Mellus, Jan. 20, 1840, and Bryant to A.
Robinson, July 13, 1841
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name "California banknote." On the Boston market, however,
which was much more developed and sensitive to the laws of
supply and demand, prices fluctuated slightly. When the Barn-
stable left Boston, a hide was valued at 12 to 12M cents per pound.
This had been the usual price for many years; one which rose
and fell only by fractions of a cent. By the end of 1844 however,
prices had fallen to 9%, to 10 per pound and never recovered.21 The
Barnstable's hides fetched, in the summer and autumn of 1845, a
price of 10^ per pound, as set out in Table 2. This was 16.67 per
cent below the usual price of 12^ per pound. With these figures
in mind, we are now in a position to determine what a cargo of
normal weight would have fetched at average prices. From the
equation that 94.73 per cent of an average weight at 83.33 per cent
of the average price are equal to the actual proceeds of the sale of
hides of the Barnstable, we conclude that at normal prices and at
a normal weight the hides would have fetched 126.68 per cent of
the actual proceeds. In plain figures, the hides sold in Boston for
$69,216.55 would have fetched, under normal conditions, $87,683.53.
These figures have been inserted in Table 4. Other items depend-
ing upon the amount of sales (sales charges and commission) have
been changed accordingly. On the other hand, the items "Hides
per Alert" and "Hides shipped to Antwerp" remain unchanged.
The Alert had returned the year before and probably sold her cargo
at the higher price of 12$( per pound and the sale of hides shipped
to Antwerp was not influenced by Boston market conditions.
Analyzing this hypothetical Statement of Profit and Loss (Table
4), which suggests what could have been obtained under average
to good conditions, we see at once that the surplus is quite sub-
stantial. Again compared to the invested capital it represents a
capital gain of 35.32 per cent. Allowing six months for the sale of
the return cargo, it had been effected in three years which results
in an interest-rate of 11.77 per cent, per annum. In relation to the
goods sold in California ($33,000 in Boston) it amounts to a net
profit of 73.04 per cent. This figure, however, is still not quite cor-
rect. The venture of the Barnstable consisted, actually, of two dif-
ferent lines of business: first, the sale of an assorted cargo against
hides in California; and, second, the sale of hides for cash in New
England. From Table 3 we have learned that the cargo worth
about $33,000 in Boston had been sold for hides, bullock horns,
gold, and sea-otter skins representing a value, in California, of
21
 Boston Shipping List; also Shipping and Commercial List and New York Price Current
of the corresponding years
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TABLE 4
SHIP Barnstable
HYPOTHETICAL STATEMENT OF PROFIT AND LOSS *
Expenditures
Cargo
Outfit
Specie
Commission on outfit
Wages for ship's crew
30/38 of the actual sum of $10,538.14
Insurance premiums
Basic premium of 7'A% of $60,000
Other expenditures
Depreciation of ship
Commission on operating cost
30/38 of actual sum of $249.40
Commission supercargo and pay clerk
Supercargo: commission of 6%% of net pro-
ceeds of $103,693.80
Pay clerk
Sales charges
126.68% of actual charges of $6,807.96
Surplus
Total Expenditures
Returns
Freightage
Sale of sea-otter skins
Sale of bullock horns
Sale of gold
Sale of hides
Hides per Alert
Sold in Antwerp
Sold in Boston
at $126.68% of actual sale
Total Returns
$39,035.07
1,646.75
4,019.60
$1,065.91
8,319.60
4,500.00
494.22
5,000.00
196.89
$6,740.10
150.00
6,890.10
8,578.04
24,133.26
$103,879.44
$185.64
4,500.00
297.50
2,958.96
$1,047.64
7,206.17
87,683.53
95,937.34
$103,879.44
° If the Barnstable had operated under "normal" conditions, i.e. duration of voyage
30 months; Boston price for hides 12* per lb. (10* per lb. for culled hides). Positions
which differ from the actual Statement of Profit and Loss (Table 2) are set in italics.
$69,361.75. These articles were sold at an increase in Boston, namely
for $84,179.18. Under better conditions, they could have been sold
for $103,693.80 as set out in Table 4. The final surplus, then, results
from both the trade in California and the sale of hides in Boston.
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These reflections on the two-fold business allow us to understand
why the New Englanders preferred to trade on a barter basis in-
stead of with cash. The scarcity of specie, often complained of in
the business correspondence was, to be sure, one reason for this
procedure.22 Equally or even more important, was that this ex-
change trade meant two separate business transactions which could
be carried out at the same time and at about the same cost. The
ship which had to sail anyhow to California could just as well carry
a cargo on her way out. The collecting of hides at the different
ports of California could just as well be combined with a sale of
imported goods. The overheads remained more or less the same
for the two combined deals, and the trading firm cut its slice from
both.
From the above figures it also appears that the selling of im-
ported goods against hides was the much more profitable part of
the business, even when hides commanded a good price in Boston.
When prices in Boston were low, as was actually the case with the
Barnstable's voyage, purchasing hides in California and selling them
in New England was anything but profitable. In fact, the voyage
of the Barnstable did not end with financial disaster only because
the profits of the California part of the business cushioned the
losses of the second part. Had the hides of the Barnstable been
acquired in California for cash, then the gross profit margin be-
tween the purchase price in California and the selling price in
Boston would not even have absorbed the operating costs of the
ship, let alone resulted in a surplus — even if we take into account
that hides, normally valued at $2.00 each in California were traded
for $1.50 in cash. As it was, the gross profit margin on goods sold
in California covered approximately all the expenses of the voyage
and the net profit of the enterprise as a whole depended upon the
sale prices in Boston. If they were low, the profit was minimal;
at average prices, the gain was, as we have seen, far from being
spectacular. Our analysis suggests that the statement of James
Douglas that the Boston merchants traded "on liberal terms" in
California was correct, and that Richard Henry Dana's less well-
informed profit estimates were not.
22
 See e.g. Bryant Papers, vol. 11, Bryant to Thos. B. Park, May 2, 1838.
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